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Abstract. Information hiding techniques are increasingly utilized by the current malware to hide 
its existence and communication attempts. In this paper we highlight this new trend by 
reviewing the most notable examples of malicious software that shows this capability. 
Introduction 
We’re experiencing an exponential growth in malicious software. According to the antivirus 
research firm AV-TEST, 2014 saw approximately 130 million new forms of malware, compared to 
just over 80 million in 2013 and about 30 million in 2012 (www.av-
test.org/en/statistics/malware). Although the influx of malware has drawn the attention of 
security experts worldwide, the countermeasures that are currently available are progressively 
showing their limitations. For example, Symantec, one of the largest antivirus vendors, recently 
admitted that its products are able to detect only approximately 45 percent of new threats.1 As 
a result, we should expect a relevant increase in the number of undiscovered types of malware.  
Consider the case of the Regin Trojan, called a “top-tier espionage tool” by Symantec and other 
security companies. The sophistication of Regin and other malware such as Flame, Duqu, and 
Stuxnet leads industry experts to believe that they weren’t created by “typical” cybercriminals 
for profit. Instead, they’re thought to be created by nation-states to spy on a wide range of 
international targets and eventually launch attacks if necessary. Regin has been used since at 
least 2008 to spy on several international targets including government and business 
organizations, infrastructure operators, researchers, and private individuals. Its six-year period 
of hidden activity raises the question: How can malware developers avoid detection for long 
periods of time?  
Information Hiding 
Providing a clear answer is difficult, but the most common arguments consider the increasing 
degree of sophistication of new threats, such as modular design to enable customization (seen 
in Regin, Flamer, and Weevil) or multistage loading architectures in which each stage is hidden 
and encrypted (seen in Regin, Stuxnet, and Duqu). In this article, we highlight the importance of 
understanding information-hiding techniques in malware. These techniques have often been 
neglected by the security community, but are widely used to exfiltrate data and make security 
threats stealthier by postponing their detection for as long as possible.  
Information hiding is part of a wide spectrum of methods that are used to make data difficult 
to notice. This practice shouldn’t be confused with encryption, in which the content is 
unreadable, as it is instead overt. Such mechanisms are often used jointly to ensure that a 
conversation remains unreadable. Steganography is one of the most well-known subfields of 
information hiding and aims to cloak secret data in a suitable carrier. Historical examples include 
the use of tattoos or invisible ink to hide a conversation from unauthorized observers.2  
Typically, to exchange secrets, the involved parties must agree on a preshared scheme and 
embed the secrets in a carrier: the greater the carrier’s popularity, the better its masking 
capacity. Too many alterations would reveal the presence of hidden information, thus limiting 
the amount of data that can be covertly transmitted. For example, using too many least 
significant bits of an image’s pixels as the carrier can reveal the secret data due to visible 
artifacts. Onkar Dabeer and his colleagues’ “Detection of Hiding in the Least Significant Bit” 
shows a representative method of detecting this scheme.3  
Networks play an important role in modern malware, making network steganography a 
crucial tool: in this case, the secret is injected into network traffic. For example, the data can be 
cloaked by manipulating the content of unused flags within headers or by modulating the inter-
packet time (IPT) of network flow datagrams. In the latter case, a sender can encode bits of 
information in previously agreed-upon IPT values. Similar to the LSB modification of image’s 
pixels example, overly aggressive deviations would make it possible to differentiate the hiding 
process from normal jitter events. Therefore, hidden channels are typically characterized by a 
low bandwidth, often ranging from a few to a few hundreds bits per second.  
Today, many other methods enable covert communications among desktops or digital 
devices, including generating inaudible sounds or utilizing a smartphone’s sensors to receive a 
sequence that activates a threat. Malware can use information-hiding techniques to cloak its 
existence, making it harder to detect. Having a better understanding of these types of malware 
will help security professionals detect, mitigate, and prevent attacks.  
Roots of the New Trend 
Advancements in security systems over the past 15 years have forced malware developers to 
investigate new possibilities to make their “products” stealthier. Although it’s difficult to 
determine the origin of information-hiding techniques, the first massive usage of these 
techniques can be traced back to 2006, when Operation Shady RAT led to attacks against 
numerous institutions worldwide and inflicted damage for months.4 Years later, security experts 
agreed that the main program responsible for this attack was the phishing virus 
Trojan.Downbot.5 This virus created a back door and then downloaded files appearing as real 
HTML pages or JPEG images. These files were encoded with commands that would allow remote 
servers to gain access to local files on the infected host computer.  
Other notable examples of information hiding–capable malware include Regin and 
Linux.Fokirtor, which use network traffic to covertly leak data, and Alureon, Duqu, Lurk, and 
Trojan.Zbot, which use digital images as hidden data carriers. Even when rudimentary, new 
threats exploiting some form of information hiding continue to be discovered, as seen in 
Soundcomber and AirHopper, which modify the status of shared hardware/software resources 
to exfiltrate confidential data, and in Feederbot, W32.Morto, and Smuggler, which manipulate 
network traffic for this purpose. 
Smartphones are better suited than desktops to exploit information hiding because they 
natively incorporate cameras, GPS, WLAN, Bluetooth, cellular networks, and other various 
sensors.6 Even when using legacy general packet radio service or connectivity with bandwidth 
scarcity—in which case, data leaking could be very slow or impracticable—the availability of 
different carriers could provide an effective workaround. Furthermore, after their success with 
desktops, malware developers turned a significant portion of their attention to mobile devices, 
leading to a 1,800 percent increase in mobile malware over the past two years, as reported by 
McAfee.7 Threats using information hiding on mobile platforms could be the next great 
challenge for security researchers.  
Information-Hiding Malware: A Classification 
Nearly all information hiding–capable malware was discovered between 2011 and 2014, with a 
peak in 2014. Table 1 shows the most popular types and proof-of-concept implementations 
proposed by the research community. However, we consider only examples that are sufficiently 
mature to be deployed in real scenarios. A convenient way to organize existing hiding-capable 
malware is according to the methodology used to implement covert communications. As such, 
we introduce three major groups:  
 group 1—methods that hide information by modulating the status of shared 
hardware/software resources, 
 group 2—methods that inject secret data into network traffic, and 
 group 3—methods that embed secret data by modifying a digital file’s structure or 
using digital media steganography, for example, by manipulating image pixels or 
sound samples. 
Groups 2 and 3 contain techniques that are primarily used to increase the stealthiness of 
communications carrying commands or leaked data that are mainly observed in malware-
targeting desktops. Group 1 includes mechanisms that bypass a security perimeter, such as a 
sandbox, or enable communications from or to an isolated source or destination, for example, 
two disconnected devices located on the same workbench. In this case, the prime targets are 
smartphones and mobile devices.  
Next, we describe what we consider the three most meaningful examples for each group. 
Table 1. The most popular and recent information hiding–capable malware. Real-
life malware means real information hiding-capable malware found by antivirus 
vendors in the Internet; academic means proof-of-concept malware proposed by 
academic community. 
Malware name or developers Group Discovery/proposal 
date 
Desktop (D) 
or mobile 
(M) 
Real-life 
malware (R) or 
academic (A) 
Soundcomber 1, 2 Feb. 2011 M A 
Trojan.Downbot 3 May 2011 D R 
Feederbot 2 Aug. 2011 D R 
W32.Morto 2 Aug. 2011 D R  
Alureon 3 Sept. 2011 D R  
Duqu 3 Sept. 2011 D R 
Gasior and Yang14,15 2 Oct. 2011/Dec. 2012 M A 
Trojan:Android/FakeRegSMS.B 3 Jan. 2012 M R 
Marforio and his colleagues16 1 Dec. 2012 M A 
Sensor-based malware 1 May 2013 M A 
KINS Trojan (variant of Zeus) 3 June 2013 D R 
Linux.Fokirtor 2 Sept. 2013 D R 
Lalande and Wendzel17 1 Sept. 2013 M A 
Inaudible sound-based malware 1 Nov. 2013/Aug. 2014 D/M A 
Lurk 3 Feb. 2014 D R 
Trojan.Zbot 3 Mar. 2014 D R 
Oldboot.B 3 Apr. 2014 M R 
AirHopper 1 Oct. 2014 D/M A 
Smuggler18 2 Nov. 2014 D/M A 
Multilayer .NET malware 3 Nov. 2014 D R 
Regin 2 Nov. 2014 D R 
Group 1 
Researchers’ increasing attention combined with Android’s open source nature has allowed the 
development of many instances of proof-of-concept information hiding–capable mobile 
malware. A prime example is Soundcomber,8 which covertly transmits the buttons pressed 
during a call, for example, when entering a PIN for a bank service. Notably, it uses information 
hiding to bypass the security framework of mobile OSs. In fact, the malware could have 
insufficient privileges to access the network to exfiltrate data, so it can use a “colluding” 
application to leak data outside the device.  
Soundcomber utilizes several information-hiding methods to form four local covert channels 
whose range is limited to the single device. The covert techniques exploit the most popular 
smartphone functionalities such as vibration or volume settings (one process differentiates 
vibration or volume status, and another infers secret data bits from this event), screen state 
(secret bits are transferred by acquiring and releasing the wake-lock permission that controls 
the screen state), and file locks (secret data are exchanged between the processes by competing 
for a file lock). 
As we mentioned, another relevant field in which information hiding can be used is the covert 
transmission of data from and to devices that are physically isolated from other peers. For 
instance, Luke Deshotels uses standard smartphone speakers to transmit data via ultrasonic 
sounds.9 This technique can cover distances up to 30 meters with a rate of 9 bits per second. 
Similarly, AirHopper enables infected devices to communicate by modulating the graphics 
processing unit load to emit electromagnetic signals.10 In this case, the coverage is reduced to 7 
meters, but the rate is in the range of 100 to 500 bits per second.  
Finally, in “Sensing-Enabled Channels for Hard-to-Detect Command and Control of Mobile 
Devices,” Ragib Hasan and his colleagues demonstrate a method to trigger attacks on a large 
population of infected smartphones in the same geographic area.11 Latent malware could be 
activated by using built-in sensors listening to ad hoc hidden stimuli, such as a song with a 
particular pattern, vibrations from a subwoofer, or the ambient light from a TV or a monitor.  
Group 2 
In 2011, Symantec announced the discovery of the worm W32.Morto, which propagates using a 
vulnerability in the remote desktop protocol. To communicate with command and control 
(C&C), it uses domain name system (DNS) records. Specifically, W32.Morto exploits the TXT 
record, which was originally introduced to contain text readable by humans. W32.Morto queries 
for a DNS TXT record (not for a domain to IP lookup), and then validates and decrypts the 
returned data. The obtained information typically yields a binary signature and an IP address 
where the worm can retrieve another malware to execute.  
The recently identified Linux.Fokirtor is a Trojan virus that opens a back door and allows 
attackers to remotely compromise a host. Symantec reported that the malware was utilized in 
May 2013 to attack one of the largest hosting providers and focused on stealing confidential 
customer information such as credentials and emails.12 As cybercriminals realized that their 
target network was generally well protected, they hid malware communications in an innocent 
secure shell and other server process network traffic. In addition to this information-hiding 
technique, Linux.Fokirtor used the Blowfish encryption algorithm to cipher stolen data or other 
communications with its C&C server. 
In November 2014, Regin took malware stealthiness a step further. It utilized many 
sophisticated mechanisms, including antiforensics capabilities, a custom-built encrypted virtual 
file system, and an alternative encryption (RC5 variant). It also exploited information hiding in 
network traffic to covertly communicate with its C&C server by tunneling secrets in Internet 
Control Message Protocol/ping traffic and embedding commands in HTTP cookies or in custom 
TCP segments and UDP datagrams.  
Group 3 
In the second half of 2011, the Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security in Budapest, 
Hungary, discovered malware generating strange files with the prefix “~DQ”; as a result, it was 
named Duqu.13 It bears many resemblances to the famous Stuxnet worm, which was likely 
developed to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Duqu is generally considered the precursor to 
a future Stuxnet-like attack. Duqu’s main aim is to gather information about industrial control 
systems. To exfiltrate secrets, it encrypted data, which was appended at the end of innocent 
digital images and then sent over the Internet to a C&C server. This approach postponed the 
worm’s detection because the images containing leaked information were hidden in the bulk of 
actual digital pictures. In the same period, a variant of Alureon used a comparable technique.  
In February 2014, malware called Lurk was found spreading via websites using <iframes> or 
an Adobe Flash exploit. A thorough analysis revealed the use of steganography to embed 
encrypted URLs in an image by manipulating pixels. Such information is then used to retrieve an 
additional payload. 
Another approach uses a variant of the Trojan.Zbot malware, which was first detected in 
2014. This version downloaded innocent-looking JPEG images depicting sunsets or cats that 
contained a list of IP addresses to be inspected, mainly pointing at financial institutions. Once 
users visit any of the listed destinations, the malware proceeds to steal their confidential 
information, such as access credentials. 
Regin, Duqu, and Lurk are real-life examples of what security experts should expect to see 
daily in the future. In fact, even if the information-hiding methods utilized in current and future 
malware aren’t yet very sophisticated, they could become dangerous in the next few years if 
state-of-the-art academic solutions are considered. 
Future Trends 
Due to the rich availability of options and the masking features offered by the massive utilization 
of the Internet, malware developers could find the highest potential in network steganography. 
Although early steganographic techniques focused only on modifying unused fields of TCP/IP 
headers (such as the type of service field of IPv4, which is rarely set by routers), more recent and 
sophisticated methods include, but aren’t limited to, the exploitation of flows produced by 
popular services such as Skype and BitTorrent. Furthermore, network traffic produced by 
popular online games can be used to covertly exchange data, even in devices with limited 
capabilities, such as gaming consoles. In fact, the signaling used to locate players in a first-
person shooter game can be an effective carrier. To this end, some bits of the set of coordinates 
and angles can be used to hide data.3 
In addition, because smartphones are complete computing platforms, they can leverage all 
the techniques presented in this article and combine them with a rich set of sensors, offering 
essentially unlimited options for covertly communicating with the surrounding environment. 
From this perspective, we can envision the following future trends:  
 New information-hiding techniques will be continually introduced, and their degree 
of sophistication will increase. Hence, future malware-related traffic could be harder 
to detect. 
 Information hiding offers a decoupled design. Therefore, it can be easily 
incorporated into every type of malware to provide stealthy communication of both 
control commands and the exfiltration of confidential user data as well as 
communication from isolated environments or networks. 
 Information hiding–capable malware can remain cloaked for a long period of time 
while slowly but continuously leaking sensitive user data. Thus, this type of malware 
must be considered a new advanced persistent threat and must be addressed 
properly. 
A long-term solution to these trends is to consider the potential vulnerabilities enabling covert 
communications from the very early design phases of desktop and mobile platforms, services, 
and protocols. For existing devices, especially smartphones, a short-term approach would 
require some form of ad hoc mitigation, at least for the most hazardous threats. However, this a 
posteriori approach is very difficult because there aren’t yet any universal countermeasures. We 
hope that raising awareness and understanding of these information-hiding techniques will help 
researchers and security experts develop the necessary countermeasures.   
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